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Reductionism and Non-Reductionism are two camps in the literature on the epistemology of 
testimony, each with their own unique difficulties. Hybrid views have emerged to alleviate 
problems and preserve insights of each camp, but still suffer in various ways from the problems 
that motivated hybrid views in the first place. The hybrids I consider grant an uptake principle 
requiring epistemic agents to be able to cite positive reasons, other than the receipt of testimony, 
to be epistemically justified in their uptake. I group stronger and weaker versions under the 
heading PR-N-Always (positive reasons are always necessary) and argue this requirement for 
independent confirmation fails to strike a balance between the theoretical desiderata of being 
neither too gullible nor generally skeptical about everyday testimonial uptake. I propose instead 
the uptake principle PR-N-Unfriendly, which states that positive reasons are only necessary for 
justified uptake when the unfriendliness of the testimonial environment is over a threshold, 
where the friendliness of the environment is a ratio of perceived epistemic safety over subject 
stakes. Thus, my view contends that stakes of epistemic agents influence the testimonial 
environment and the epistemic warrant of uptake. Additionally, my hybrid theory of testimony 
doubles as a theory of epistemic trust. I argue there is an epistemic trust condition on testimony 
whereby for testimonial uptake to be warranted it must have been instantiated by epistemic trust 
which was warranted. My hybrid view is unique insofar as it draws on the notions of epistemic 
trust and subject stakes to generate explanatory and theoretical insights better than alternatives. 
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§ 1. Preamble 
Giving and receiving testimony is pervasive in everyday life. Testimony is a crucial source of 
our beliefs, and it is the most prevalent form of knowledge transmission. The literature on 
testimony is rich and far-reaching, extending well into epistemology, philosophy of science, 
philosophy of language and psychology. In this paper, I focus on the debate between 
Reductionism versus Non-Reductionism regarding the justification of testimonially acquired 
beliefs. I argue for a hybrid theory that combines the insights of both approaches. On my view, 
whether we are warranted in believing on the basis of testimony depends on whether trust in our 
epistemic source is warranted, which in turn depends, inter alia, on our stakes.  
The paper is structured as follows: §1 clarifies some basic terms to understand the 
project. §2 covers objections and benefits of both camps, Reductionism and Non-Reductionism. 
§3 is the statement of my account. §4 explains some other hybrid views and argues for the 
superiority of my view, and §5 discusses other questions and objections before concluding. 
§ 1.1 Belief, Uptake, Testimony 
The uptake of testimony is the process of forming a belief in the content of a proposition 
presented through testimony. The metaphysical debate on the nature of testimony is healthy, but 
not directly relevant to my arguments in the epistemology of testimony. I take testimony to be an 
intentional assertion, presented-as-true by agents, typically for agents.  
§ 1.2 Justification, Entitlement and Warrant 
At least two kinds of justification can be distinguished: argumentative justification and 
entitlements. Argumentative justification represents the ability for a subject to articulate 
arguments for the truth of a proposition and for this argument to be supported by reasons 
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available in the subject’s cognitive repertoire. Entitlements are rights to rely on a given cognitive 
practice and, unlike argumentative justifications, need not be understood, accessible or 
articulable by the cognizer. Entitlements are the externalist analog of justification (Burge, 1993). 
Warrant is used generally as a positive epistemic status, which includes both the internalist and 
externalist varieties, i.e. justification and entitlement. I follow Gerken (2013) in adopting what he 
calls ‘inclusive epistemic pluralism’ about testimonial warrant. Pluralism about testimonial 
warrant stands opposed to monism, meaning that a testimonially-based belief may enjoy both 
internalist warrant (justification) and externalist warrant (entitlement). Inclusive pluralism would 
allow that an instance of testimonial uptake may enjoy both kinds of warrant at the same time, in 
contrast to the exclusive brand. Like Gerken, I take it that pluralism about warrant is domain-
specific, e.g. one can be a pluralist about testimonial warrant and a monist about perceptual 
warrant. Finally, I will call the extended body of warrant all the warrant of the speaker and the 
prior sources in the testimonial chain. 
§ 1.3 Non-Epistemic Factors and Stakes  
The testimonial environment includes all factors outside of the literal content of the testimonial 
assertion. They can include, but are not limited to, epistemic standards, stakes of epistemic 
agents, whether the testimony was solicited or not, location, past utterances (e.g. past relationship 
with testifier) etc. Hearer stakes play an essential explanatory role in my theory. For a hearer, 
having high stakes in a testimony means perceiving the truth or falsity of the content of a 
testimony to have an important bearing on one’s life. What is at stake is some good that is 
contingent on having a true belief about the subject matter of the testimony. I use an internalist or 
subjective notion of stakes (i.e. a perceived good that one has mental access to). This is simply 
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what matters to the individual, their perceived or subjective evaluation of what is important to 
them, regardless of what might be ‘objectively’ reasonable or moral (if there is such a thing). 
§ 2. Two Camps in the Epistemology of Testimony 
Now that some key terms have been explained, I need to discuss two camps in the epistemology 
of testimony. Reductionism and Non-Reductionism are two broad classes of views, each with 
various formulations and nuances, but common cores on which I will focus when addressing 
them. Their differences are about the nature of testimonial justification and the conditions under 
which a hearer is justified in accepting testimony. Reductionism claims that the justification for 
accepting testimony can be reduced to other sources of justification, such as evidence that the 
testimonial source is reliable or the like. Unlike Reductionism, Non-Reductionism usually deems 
the receipt of a testimony itself to be a sufficient positive reason for justified acceptance of the 
claim, unless there are stronger epistemic defeaters. 
§ 2.1. Reductionism 
Reductionism has two defining commitments: The Positive Reasons (PR) thesis and Reduction 
Thesis (RT).  
PR: The possession of additional positive reasons by hearers, as well as receiving 
testimony, is necessary for warrant/justification to be conferred on testimonial beliefs. 
We can distinguish two versions of the PR condition, one on which the possession of appropriate 
positive reasons is necessary and sufficient for warrant/justification (PR-N&S) and one on which 
it is merely necessary (PR-N).1  
RT: Testimonial justification is non-basic and reducible to non-testimonial justification 
from other more basic faculties like perception, memory, and inference.  
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Contemporary philosophers defending various versions of Reductionism include: Adler (1994), 
Fricker (1994; 1995; 2006), Lipton (1998), Lyons (1997), Mackie (1970), Shogenji (2006), and 
Van Cleve (2006). 
§ 2.1.1 Merits of Reductionism 
The real strength of Reductionism is that it places a higher standard on justification (and thereby 
knowledge) than Non-Reductionism, which is a point to its credit in difficult cases where truth is 
particularly important. Adopting a Reductionist strategy might make an agent less prone to 
believing something unjustifiably and can be considered a “less gullible” theory than Non-
Reductionism. A more reserved character allows the reductionist uptake condition (PR-N) to 
deal with situations where getting truth is very important, for example, in the case of a life-
changing medical diagnosis. It seems that the reductionist uptake principles are likelier to refrain 
from attributing justification to situations where uptake would not be justified because they 
require independent confirmation, which makes them more cautious. If one is feeling risk-averse 
or error-avoidant, they will likely be drawn to Reductionism since, by design, it can cover 
problematic cases, i.e. cases where getting the truth is very important. One can hardly conceive 
of an epistemology of testimony where reductionist concerns of gullibility did not matter. 
Reductionism is here to stay, at least the part that can deal with problematic cases. The cost of 
being too cautious, however, is potentially missing out on warranted uptake elsewhere. 
§ 2.1.2 Over-intellectualizing Objection to Reductionism  
A critique of Reductionism is that it over-intellectualizes most instances of testimony by 
requiring positive reasons on behalf of the hearer for uptake to be justified. Since most instances 
of testimony are mundane, one does not have to be very imaginative here to find a slew of claims 
that are justifiably uptaken without additional cognitively accessible positive reasons. When 
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asking someone waiting at the bus stop whether the bus has passed yet or not, one does not need 
to have in their mind any positive reasons beyond the speaker’s testimony for this sort of uptake 
to be warranted.2 Therefore, Reductionism over-intellectualizes most instances of testimony, 
namely the low-stakes and mundane cases. However, this is unacceptable because those form the 
major core of the body of our beliefs based on testimony, which form an indispensable part of 
our beliefs generally.  
§ 2.1.3 Skepticism Objection to Reductionism  
The skepticism charge is the natural follow-up of the previous objection. If we are not generally 
disposed to provide adequate independent confirmation of testimony by Reductionist standards, 
then Reductionism risks leading to general skepticism. Reductionism imposes difficult or 
impossible standards, especially in mundane cases, and thereby risks leading agents towards 
undue general skepticism about testimonial uptake. Since most testimonial cases are of mundane 
and everyday uptake, if Reductionism brings those cases under threat, then it threatens 
generalized skepticism. But it is unacceptable that Reductionism denies knowledge in many 
cases where we would want to grant knowledge. An epistemic theory of testimony should not 
predict general skepticism about testimony because that unduly contradicts everyday experiences 
and is excessively unintuitive. We require a theory that is optimistic about the mundane and 
everyday testimonial uptake and that is careful about uptake in problematic cases. 
In sum, the requirement for independent confirmation generates what I take to be the two 
main and related problems. The first charge is that it over-intellectualizes testimony, which is a 
main source of epistemically warranted beliefs. The second is that it thereby makes knowledge 
scarce. If one wants a theory able to account for the general acceptance of everyday testimony 
(or natural testimony as ‘tellings more generally’) Reductionism will seem too restrictive and 
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unintuitive. These concerns are in part why non-reductionists have appealed to a general 
entitlement for accepting testimony, which prescribes epistemically warranted uptake in a way 
that is more congruent with our experience than skepticism about testimony. 
§ 2.2 Non-Reductionism 
Non-reductionists hold that testimonial uptake is prima facie warranted, without appealing to a 
reduction to more basic sources. Non-Reductionism (N-R) rejects the two theses in §2.1, and 
instead holds their negations: No-Positive Reason Thesis and No-Reduction Thesis. Non-
Reductionism contends that testimony is a basic source of justification, and the hearer typically 
has a prima facie entitlement to accept it. That is, the presence of positive reasons outside of 
receiving testimony are not necessary to be justified in accepting the testimony; just the absence 
of negative reasons (defeaters) for believing testimony. Contemporary defenders of N-R include: 
Audi (1997), Burge (1993), Coady (1994), Origgi (2005), Hinchman (2005), and Perrine (2014). 
§ 2.2.1 Merits of Non-Reductionism 
Promising aspects of Non-Reductionism are that it does not force us into a generalized 
skepticism about testimony, nor does it downplay the importance of testimony as one of our most 
prevalent and commonplace epistemic sources of knowledge. It conforms with epistemic 
intuitions about the great majority of testimonial cases and it does not unduly over-intellectualize 
testimony. 
§ 2.2.2 Gullibility Objection to Non-Reductionism 
The most pressing objection against N-R is that it would necessarily lead to gullibility. It may 
come as no surprise that people can purposely lie or deceive us, nor that testifiers may believe 
they are being truthful when they are mistaken. The criticism is that Non-Reductionism cannot 
deal with those cases because they are committed to a prima facie entitlement to accept the 
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testimony of others. This leads Fricker (1994) to argue that we cannot square non-gullibility with 
one of Non-Reductionism’s main theses: that there is some entitlement to accept testimony. 
Because N-R necessarily leads to gullibility, and gullibility cannot be allowed in good epistemic 
conscience, it follows N-R cannot be allowed in good epistemic conscience (Fricker, 1994). 
§ 2.3 Two Desiderata: Between Routine Acceptance & Reason-Based Rejection 
This section has clarified why at least two desiderata must be preserved for a good 
epistemological theory of testimony. Namely, first, that it does not lead the epistemic subject 
towards gullibility and, second, that it does not lead to general skepticism about testimonial 
uptake. I believe the camps of Reductionism and Non-Reductionism each capture one of these 
two good results. Hybrid views are uniquely poised to capture both. As I will argue in §4, 
however, in an attempt to safeguard against the gullibility-styled charges, the extant hybrid views 
I consider swing too far the other direction, threatening to become skeptical or unintuitive and 
out of touch with everyday experience. While these views have important features, which I 
borrow, the view I offer is intended to be more explanatory, intuitive and balanced. 
§ 3. My Hybrid View 
The move toward a hybrid view is wise in light of the shortcomings of Reductionism and Non-
Reductionism alone as foundations for a complete epistemic theory of testimony. In the next 
section, I will explore three hybrid views (by Pritchard, Lackey and Faulkner). These defend 
versions of the Positive Reasons Thesis (PR-N or PR-N&S) which I group under the heading 
PR-N-Always. I ultimately reject these views because of their commitment to PR-N Always and 
because they do not adequately account for the influence of subject stakes on epistemic matters. 
Also, besides Faulkner’s view, the other hybrids do not draw on the concept of epistemic trust 
and therefore miss out on its explanatory power. My view resists objections while keeping the 
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positive aspects of those views. Thus, mine offers explanatory power and theoretical benefits at 
no significant cost. These views have an underlying commitment that cognitively accessible 
positive reasons are always required on behalf of the hearer for warranted testimonial uptake 
whereas I will submit instead an uptake principle that requires these kinds of positive reasons for 
warranted uptake only if the epistemic environment is epistemically unfriendly. The epistemic 
friendliness of the environment is a ratio calculated as follows: 
epistemic friendliness =
 perceived epistemic safety of the epistemic environment
subject stakes3
 
Epistemic safety measures how easily a belief could have been wrong.4 An environment is 
epistemically safe if it would not easily lead to uptake of unwarranted or false beliefs.5  
 
The following is a statement of my theory of warranted testimonial uptake: 
H is justified in uptaking testimony that p from source S iff, 
(1) S asserts that p 
(2) H adequately perceives the epistemic safety of the environment 
(3) And either Case I or Case II obtain 
Case I: 
(4) The epistemic environment is friendly 
(5) H has justified affective epistemic trust in S that p 
Case II: 
(6) The epistemic environment is unfriendly (or friendly)6 
(7) H has justified cognitive epistemic trust in S that p 
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Condition (2) ensures that the hearer is not overly sensitive (e.g. extreme paranoia) or 
underly sensitive (e.g. oblivious to any and all defeaters) to defeaters in the environment. This 
ensures they are adequately perceptive epistemic agents, in other words, that hearer H is a 
reliable or properly functioning recipient of testimony. Condition (3) provides the case 
distinction between friendly and unfriendly environments. It allows epistemic trust to play an 
explanatory role regarding the use of the epistemic subjects’ relevant epistemic abilities. 
Conditions (5) and (7) are explicated by my account of justified epistemic trust below.7 Roughly, 
justified affective epistemic trust relies on a general entitlement to accept testimony for its 
epistemic warrant, and represents the N-R component of my hybrid view. On the other hand, 
justified cognitive epistemic trust represents the reductionist wing of the hybrid view and derives 
its (argumentative) justification from the additional, cognitively accessible positive reasons of 
the hearer. Thus, we obtain the following uptake principle. 
PR-N-Unfriendly: The need for additional positive reasons is inversely correlated with 
the friendliness of the environment.  
The PR-N-Unfriendly is appropriately sensitive to subject stakes and therefore tracks positive 
epistemic standing better than PR-N-Always. I will now show in greater detail how subject 
stakes and epistemic trust can play crucial explanatory roles in the epistemology of testimony.  
§ 3.1 Epistemic Trust 
§ 3.1.1 Practical Interests and the Two Pathways of Epistemic Trust 
Some have appealed to a dual-pathway model to preserve both aforementioned theoretical 
desiderata: a theory neither leads the epistemic subject towards gullibility nor general skepticism 
about testimonial uptake. Thagard (2005) notes that a general theory of testimony must be able to 
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explain how “testimony is usually accepted automatically but also how it sometimes provokes 
extensive reflection about the claim being made and the claimant who is making it” (p. 297).  
Epistemic trust has a dual nature: two pathways, a default, and a reflective pathway. 
Practical interests act as a trigger that shifts from one to the other. The dual nature of Epistemic 
Trust (ET) is rooted in two types of processes, Affective (AET) and Cognitive (CET). These 
roughly reflect Kahneman’s (2011) System 1 and System 2 pathways. The latter is more 
deliberate, slower and thoughtful, while the former is more intuitive, faster and emotional. 
Epistemic trust is CET when it involves decision-making, over a length of time, by a process that 
includes consciously weighing reasons like in rational deliberation, reflection or thinking. 
Epistemic trust is AET when it is an affective attitude, when it is instantiated near 
instantaneously, through a minimal weighing of reasons or deliberation of which one is 
conscious. I will now argue that both CET and AET can be epistemically justified/warranted and 
specify the conditions under which they are. 
§ 3.1.2 Justified Cognitive and Affective Epistemic Trust 
Cognitive epistemic trust is justified in a straightforwardly reductive sense. For CET to be 
justified, it requires additional positive reasons, which are accessible to the hearer. As with 
Reductionism, the details can be filled in different ways. My theory leaves the question of how to 
best describe reductive justification relatively open and this fact does not detract from my view. I 
will not go down that relatively well-beaten path. My theory is no worse off than one’s favorite 
rendition of Reductionism for defending against the gullibility charge. The same details as one’s 
favorite reductionist theory can be filled in on my view. 
 Justified affective trust, on the other hand, is a basic-belief forming method. It can be 
used to build up foundational knowledge about the world even before we have the deliberative 
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reasoning skills required by cognitive epistemic trust. Enoch & Schechter (2008) provide a solid 
account of how basic-belief forming methods are justified. 
On their account, what explains a subject’s justification in employing basic-belief 
forming methods such as ‘Inference to the Best Explanation’ (IBE), Modus Ponens or relying on 
perception and memory is their “indispensability to a rationally required project” (p. 556). 
This is their account:  
A thinker is prima facie justified in employing a belief-forming method as 
basic if there is a project that is rationally required for the thinker such that: (i) 
it is possible for the thinker to successfully engage in the project by 
employing the method; (ii) it is impossible for the thinker to successfully 
engage in the project if the method is ineffective. Moreover, where clauses (i) 
and (ii) apply, it is in virtue of these facts that the thinker is so justified. (p. 
556-7) 
 
For them, a ‘rationally required project’ is one that a rational epistemic agent must 
engage in. Examining the environment around us, obtaining knowledge about it and constructing 
a framework from which to understand it are all candidates for such a project. Indeed, building 
up knowledge of the world as children is arguably an exemplary candidate for a rationally 
required project, and affective epistemic trust is the method that allows us to successfully engage 
in that project when employed. Furthermore, as infant epistemic subjects, which do not possess 
the relevant cognitive abilities to engage in CET or other reductionist methods, it is impossible to 
successfully engage in the project of building up knowledge of the world without that method. 
We are often rationally required to engage in the method of AET in the adult world as well. For 
example, when being trained for a new job outside of our expertise by a superior, or when 
reading nutritional information on a cereal box.8 I piggyback on their account of the justification 
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of basic-belief forming methods rather than offer additional argumentation for what I already 
consider an extremely plausible and intuitive account. 
 
§ 3.1.3 Between Skepticism and Gullibility 
I have suggested that non-negotiable desiderata for a theory of testimony are that it does not 
entail either general skepticism or gullibility. An integral motivation of my theory is that 
precision tools like PR-N-Unfriendly will track testimonial warrant better than stronger or 
weaker uptake principles. When considering the group of testimonial situations as ‘tellings’ more 
generally, it becomes obvious that skeptical reservations would be disproportionate in a majority 
of cases (testimony about whether a bus has passed, or the time of day come to mind). My uptake 
principle holds a weaker version of the PR-N-Always condition. Therefore, one cannot object 
that my view entails skepticism without also objecting to those other views even more harshly.  
As for the desiderata of gullibility avoidance, even if it is granted that Non-Reductionism 
gets the correct result in the majority of cases of natural testimony and tellings generally, it is not 
without problems. Granting that testimonial situations that require independent justification (on 
top of receiving testimony) may be less in number, they are often higher-than-average-stakes 
cases. Call this minority of cases requiring additional support the ‘problematic cases’. This 
minority, however, is a majority of the ‘important cases’ where getting it wrong can have serious 
consequences and that is where the gullibility objection gets its main impetus. After all, one 
cannot be said to be gullible for accepting mundane testimony about the weather or the speaker’s 
favorite color. The charge of gullibility only relevantly applies to important or problematic cases. 
Generally speaking, for problematic cases, stronger uptake principles (more demanding ones) are 
likelier to obtain the correct result because they appeal to something above and beyond a no-
defeater condition alone. I grant that a working theory of testimony cannot get the wrong answer 
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in important cases. Therefore, it seems just as intuitive that a good epistemic theory of testimony 
should not entail gullibility about important matters either. To cope with these worries about 
gullibility, PR-N-Always emerges as a catchall candidate for justified epistemic uptake. But, this 
swings the pendulum too far the other way, because requiring a blanket positive reasons 
condition for justified uptake stifles one’s ability to justifiably uptake mundane knowledge 
through testimony. This puts in danger a majority of our testimonial beliefs about people, the 
time, the weather and many more of life’s wonderful trivialities. My view can cope with the 
gullibility charge no worse than Reductionism, since the charge of gullibility only relevantly 
applies to important cases, and those important high-stakes cases require a reductionist uptake 
principle on my theory anyway. My view is, at the very least, no worse off than Reductionism or 
Non-Reductionism. In fact, it is better off because it keeps the best aspects of each while 
lessening the force of objections and providing additional explanatory power. 
§ 4. Other Hybrid Views? 
I have shown some shortcomings of both Reductionism and Non-Reductionism and why the 
move towards a hybrid view is preferable. Pritchard (2006), Lackey (2008) and Faulkner (2011) 
called their views ‘hybrid theories’. While there are various similarities with my view and theirs, 
I will show that these views, in varying degrees, fall short of being completely satisfactory. 
Notably because of our different uptake principles. I will now explain these other views and note 
what I take to be their weaknesses, since ultimately, I hope to contrast my view with theirs.  
§ 4.1 Pritchard’s ‘Quasi-Reductionism’ 
Pritchard’s quasi-Reductionism (2006) actually supports a foundational aspect of my view: that 
the mental life of subjects and the testimonial environment are intrinsically linked regarding 
knowledge attributions. Pritchard argues, rightly I believe, that there are ability and epistemic 
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safety (or anti-luck) conditions on knowledge. Pritchard and I take these two conditions to relate 
to each other: the safety of the environment and the demandingness of the ability condition are 
inversely correlated during knowledge attributions.  
Early in his paper, Pritchard defends the thesis that knowledge entails safe belief. Let us 
take one of his examples: Consider when Jennifer gets off a train in a foreign city and asks 
directions to a local landmark from the first person she sees. Let us assume the person asked 
knows the location of the landmark and communicates what they know to Jennifer. Pritchard 
submits that many have the intuition that Jennifer can have knowledge in this case (or else a 
great deal of what we take ourselves to know comes under threat since it is also similarly 
gained). In this case, Pritchard takes Jennifer to have knowledge, but it is not in main part 
because of her cognitive abilities. The fact they played some minimal role is not contested, since 
there is an implied counterfactual sensitivity: she did not ask a toddler, tourist, or a clearly insane 
person. If we change the case to one where Jennifer is in an extremely epistemically unsafe 
environment, where nearly every one of the potential informants is out to deceive her, she could 
not gain knowledge, even if she happened on one who was trustworthy since the safety condition 
would not obtain. Thus, the thesis that knowledge entails safe belief is not threatened.  
Now imagine as Pritchard does, that I form beliefs by simple guesswork. But a trickster 
demon ensures that every time I form a belief the world is adjusted so that the belief is true. I 
would be hard-pressed to hold a false belief, yet this would not suffice for knowledge since my 
cognitive success in no way relates to my cognitive ability. This suggests the correct account of 
knowledge has both a safety and ability requirement, though where the latter imposes a 
‘relatively modest epistemic demand’ consistent with the Jennifer case. 
Pritchard takes his account of knowledge to neatly diagnose why different conceptions of 
knowledge place quite different demands on what knowledge involves. We are more optimistic 
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about ascribing knowledge in environments that are epistemically safe than those that are not. 
When they are not, we rely on a greater use of one’s cognitive abilities to ascribe knowledge. 
When the environment is safe, it is very easy to meet the ‘anti-luck’ constraint, whereas had the 
environment been very unsafe it would be much more difficult and would require much more 
input from the successful operation of one’s cognitive abilities. My view expands on this 
relationship by studying the effects of subject stakes and linking epistemic trust to the ability 
condition on testimonial warrant. Pritchard uses epistemic ‘safety’ and epistemic ‘friendliness’ 
interchangeably, but I have used epistemic friendliness to mean the ratio of ‘perceived epistemic 
safety’ over the subject’s stakes (implying there is an agent for the environment to be ‘friendly’ 
with). To bring these insights to bear on the epistemology of testimony, let me include the 
distinction as Pritchard states it: 
Reductionism: S has testimonial knowledge that p only if the epistemic 
standing of S’s true belief that p is entirely recoverable in non-testimonial 
terms. 
Credulism (Non-Reductionism equivalent): There exist cases in which S 
has testimonial knowledge that p and yet no part of the epistemic standing 
of S’s true belief that p is due to non-testimonial factors.9 
Pritchard takes the account of knowledge under discussion (ability and anti-luck 
requirement) to not fit neatly into these categories. He notes that the first case of Jennifer above, 
at first glance seems to support credulism. But, this is deceiving since we already saw that her 
abilities have been brought to bear, however minimally, in the acquisition of knowledge. Further, 
some of the support for the belief provided by the abilities is at least partly non-testimonial (that 
children and tourists are not reliable testifiers in this case). The point is that knowledge on 
Pritchard’s view entails reliable operation of the relevant cognitive abilities, but in the case of 
testimony, entails that one’s belief enjoys “at least some non-testimonial epistemic support” (p. 
23). In this sense, it is thus straightforwardly incompatible with credulism as defined above. 
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However, it is also incompatible with the reduction thesis. As he notes: “After all, there is no 
reason why this account of knowledge should insist that the epistemic support enjoyed by a 
belief that counts as testimonial knowledge should be entirely recoverable in non-testimonial 
terms” (p. 23). For example, an agent’s cognitive ability to detect bad informants in any 
environment is in part acquired via testimony like people telling one whom to trust. For Pritchard 
then, as long as a true belief in question is appropriately related to the agent’s relevant cognitive 
abilities, and is ‘safe’, it qualifies as knowledge, “even if a full reduction of the epistemic support 
of that belief to non-testimonial sources is unavailable” (p. 23). What is core to Pritchard’s 
proposal is that some form of reduction is required for testimonial knowledge. What is essential 
for my project is to show Pritchard subscribes to PR-N-Always. In the debate between 
Reductionism and credulism, the respective points made by either side are essentially expressed 
in terms of non-testimonial grounds that the agent can cite in favor of her belief (positive 
reasons), with Reductionism demanding such non-testimonial grounds and credulism allowing 
testimonial knowledge in the absence of non-testimonial grounds. As Pritchard says: 
Noticing that quasi-Reductionism about testimonial knowledge allows 
that some form of positive epistemic standing may be traceable to entirely 
testimonial support, and thus accords with the weak form of credulism. 
What it denies is simply the more robust – and therefore less intuitive – 
formulation of credulism which allows that testimonial knowledge can be 
possessed even in the absence of any non-testimonial epistemic support 
[...]. Reflecting on the nature of knowledge reveals that it imposes two 
distinct demands, one that is to be understood in terms of cognitive 
ability, and one that is to be understood in terms of safety. Bringing this 
conclusion to bear on the epistemology of testimonial belief motivates a 
way of thinking about testimonial knowledge that does not obviously fit 
into either [R or N-R]. (p. 26, my emphasis) 
The takeaway of the section is that there is an important role for cognitive ability and the 
epistemic environment in a theory of testimony. This is reflected in the thesis that knowledge 
entails safe belief with a minimal use of one’s cognitive abilities. On this, we agree, but we draw 
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different conclusions, namely about the possibility of robust credulism (which states testimonial 
knowledge can be obtained absent any non-testimonial epistemic support). This boils down to 
our different uptake principles, PR-N-Always and PR-N-Unfriendly. I will return to these points 
when considering objections once all the cards are on the table. I turn to Lackey’s hybrid view. 
§ 4.2 Lackey’s Dualism 
Lackey (2008) argues that positive reasons are not necessary and sufficient for justified 
testimonial uptake (PR-N&S is false). She holds that positive reasons are nonetheless necessary 
(PR-N is true), thereby rejecting N-R. She opts for a hybrid view. I examine her rejection of 
Non-Reductionism, because it will be instructive and illuminating regarding our different 
theoretical commitments. Lackey characterizes NR as follows before moving to reject it:  
NR: For speaker A, and hearer, B, B knows that p on the basis of A’s testimony iff 
(NR1) B believes that p on the basis of the content of A’s testimony 
(NR2) B has no undefeated (psychological or normative) defeaters for A’s testimony 
(NR3) it is true that p 
(NR4) A’s testimony is reliable or otherwise truth-conducive 
(NR5) B is a reliable or properly functioning recipient of testimony 
(NR6) The environment in which B receives A’s testimony is suitable for the reception of 
reliable testimony 
NR1-3 are straightforward. NR4 is to prevent attributing warrant or knowledge in a case 
in which an incompetent agent who is unreliable, forms beliefs unreliably, but can still at times 
provide truthful testimony. She supports the inclusion of NR5 since one might be compulsively 
good-natured and trusting, and even though there are no defeaters for them, it may be there was 
one that reasonably should have been picked up. If there are no possible circumstances that 
would constitute a defeater for an agent, then the safety condition NR2 is not substantively 
satisfied. One can be inappropriately sensitive to defeaters (overly or underly sensitive). These 
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considerations show that in order to acquire knowledge the hearer has to be a properly 
functioning or reliable recipient of testimony (my second condition). The necessity of NR6 is 
evidenced by appealing to a case, which suggests the need for a necessary condition on the 
environment. Consider MARVIN: 
Marvin is an epistemically impeccable recipient of testimony, has the capacity to be 
sensitive to defeaters and appropriately so. On a road trip one evening, he stops in a town 
to find a hotel for the night and encounters a group of people gathered for an annual 
parade. Out of this crowd, Marvin finds Alfred, the only member of the epistemic 
community who reliably shares information with outsiders. When asked, Alfred tells 
Marvin they are in Smithville. It is true they are in Smithville, and Alfred is a reliable 
testifier, and there are no defeaters for Marvin. Does Marvin know he is in Smithville? 
Despite the satisfaction of NR1-5, Lackey responds in the negative. We can see this by 
realizing Marvin’s true belief is in large part due to good fortune. Hence, Lackey’s inclusion of 
NR6. Let us grant Lackey’s characterization of N-R as NR1-6. She contends that it is essential 
for the non-reductionists to maintain that both versions of the Positive Reasons Thesis are false 
(PR-N and PR-N&S). She holds PR-N is true, and so N-R is false. She offers an interesting case 
that is taken as a decisive blow to N-R. It purportedly meets NR1-6 and yet fails to be a case of 
knowledge. It is meant as an example featuring the complete absence of positive reasons for 
uptake. Consider ALIEN: 
Sam is an average human being and as he is walking through the forest, in the distance he 
sees someone drop a book. Their physical appearance allows Sam to identify them as an 
Alien from another planet, but he knows nothing else about this kind of alien or the 
planet they are from. Sam eventually loses sight of the alien, but he is able to recover the 
book that she dropped. Upon opening the book Sam realizes it is written in English and 
looks like what earthlings would call a diary. After reading the first sentence of the book, 
Sam forms the corresponding belief that tigers have eaten some of the aliens from the 
author’s planet while exploring Earth. As it turns out, the book is a diary and it does 
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communicate in English, it is both true and reliably written that tigers have eaten some of 
the aliens from the planet in question. Sam is not only a properly functioning recipient of 
testimony, he is also situated in an environment that is suitable for the reception of 
reliable reports.10 
Sam is taken to have truly no positive reasons, “no common-sense alien-psychological 
theory, no beliefs about the general reliability of aliens as testifiers, no beliefs about the 
reliability of the author of this book, no beliefs about how diaries function in this alien society 
and so on” (p. 169). Lackey contends this is clearly not a case of knowledge, despite purported 
satisfaction of the N-R1-6 conditions. Therefore, she argues this case suggests N-R is false.  
In §5, I discuss whether this case in fact suggests the falsity of N-R and argue it does not. 
My uptake principle can more aptly explain the intuitions regarding this case. But first, let us 
complete the exegesis of Lackey’s proposed Dualism. Lackey offers a position where the 
epistemic work is not shouldered exclusively by either hearer or speaker. The speaker-condition 
ensures reliability and the hearer-condition ensures rationality. The proposed view of testimonial 
warrant recognizes dual sources, the reliability of the speaker and rationality of the hearer. 
Dualism: For speaker A, and hearer B, B knows (believes with justification/warrant) that p on 
the basis of A’s testimony if: 
(D1) B believes that p on the basis of the content of A’s testimony 
(D2) A’s testimony is reliable or otherwise truth-conducive 
(D3) B is a reliable or properly functioning recipient of testimony 
(D4) the environment in which B receives A’s testimony is suitable for the reception of 
reliable testimony 
(D5) B has no undefeated (psychological or normative) defeaters for A’s testimony 
(D6) B has appropriate positive reasons for accepting A’s testimony. 
The takeaway is that Lackey’s dualism maintains the reductionist Positive Reasons 
uptake principle (PR-N) in D6. This is a problematic uptake principle that over-intellectualizes 
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testimony and threatens generalized skepticism about testimony as a result. In §5, I explain in 
greater detail why Lackey’s employment of the PR-N thesis is an overreaction to the ALIEN 
case. I posit these as symptoms of neglecting the theoretical role of epistemic trust and subject 
stakes. I now turn to the hybrid view most similar to my own. 
§ 4.3 Faulkner’s Hybrid View 
Faulkner and I are both unsatisfied with R and N-R. Trust also plays a central role in both our 
theories. Before diving into his critiques of opposing views and the statement of his hybrid 
theory, let us take a look at how he uses trust.  
§ 4.3.1 Faulkner’s Concept of Trust 
I want to unpack Faulkner’s use of trust since it plays a significant role in his theory and my 
own. Trusting is something we do and an attitude we have and take.  
The act of trusting is putting oneself in a position of depending on 
something happening or someone doing something. The attitude of 
trusting is then characterized as an attitude towards this dependence. [...] 
With respect to testimony, we trust speakers to tell the truth and we trust 
testimony to be true, and we show this attitude of trust by accepting what 
we are told or what is said. And when acceptance is motivated by an 
attitude of trust - when it is a case of trusting - it issues in belief. The act 
of trusting testimony is the uptake of testimony. (2011, p. 23) 
So far, we are in agreement. Faulkner distinguishes between Affective and Predictive 
trust. Although both kinds of trust have expectations, for predictive trust the expectation is 
merely a matter of prediction. The expectation is something different in the affective case, since 
it concerns another's reasons for acting. 
I expect you to see the fact that I will be waiting for you at the restaurant 
as a reason to try to turn up on time. This is a normative expectation: I 
think you should see things this way and so should act for this reason; and 
if you don’t do as I expect, or don’t act for this reason - for instance if you 
find something preferable to do - then this failure will be liable to 
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provoke my resentment. This thicker notion of trust, with its concern with 
the trusted party’s motivations, I’ve called affective trust. Affective 
because the defeat of its constitutive expectation engenders characteristic 
reactive attitudes - those provoked by trust being let down-which identify 
the expectation as normative and not merely predictive (ibid, p. 24-5). 
 I take no issue with this notion of affective trust. I readily tailor it to epistemic trust and 
employ it toward a theory of testimony. Call that ‘affective epistemic trust’. However, I have 
opted for a more nuanced version of predictive trust than Faulkner provides. He uses predictive 
trust as simply ‘depending on some outcome’ (2011, p. 24). This is the sense in which we can 
trust clocks to be on time. But, for the purposes of a theory of testimony, I propose to refer to 
only a relatively small subset of predictive trust which concerns agents (since ‘trusting’ non-
agents is a misnomer). I take Cognitive Epistemic Trust (CET) to be more appropriate to capture 
nuances in the epistemology of testimony. CET can be understood as interpersonal predictive 
trust. The epistemic components narrow it down to cases where one agent trusts another for the 
truth. This shift from predictive trust to CET highlights the cognitive part of reasoning about the 
subjectivity of other agents. It is, therefore, better suited to a theory of testimony.11 
§ 4.3.2 Faulkner: Reductionism and the Extended Body of Warrant 
Faulkner’s critique of Reductionism is that it is too restrictive in what can satisfy the ‘reasons’ 
requirement, mainly because it ‘fails to recognize how trust in a speaker can warrant uptake’ 
(2011, p. 53). His critique is based in part on the ‘problem of cooperation’, which is that there is 
always the possibility of deception and the potential rationality of lying and deceit. This 
motivates the adoption of the reductionist uptake principle (PR-N-Always) which states we must 
support the acceptance of testimony with positive reasons, or else we would not be rational. 
 
Faulkner is not satisfied with Reductionism, in part because he takes it to give a skeptical 
response to the problem of cooperation. While in ‘one-off’ testimonial situations, Reductionism 
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might predict uptake to be unwarranted, Faulkner contends knowledge through an attitude of 
trust is nonetheless possible in one-off cases because it puts the subject in contact with the 
extended body of warrant of a claim. According to Faulkner, even a sophisticated kind of 
reduction will fail to provide a non-skeptical solution to the problem of cooperation because their 
account of when an audience is warranted in the uptake of testimony is wrong. There are more 
ways of being warranted in the uptake of testimony than the reductive theory would allow. 
Namely, the attitude of trust can warrant the uptake of testimony. 
In not recognizing that our warrant for the uptake of testimony can come 
from trust, the reductive theory over-intellectualizes our relationship to 
testimony. [...] The reason why the reductive theory has a restrictive 
conception of what warrants uptake is that it assumes it to be this body of 
warrant- the audience’s own proprietary justification- that also explains 
the audience’s acquisition of knowledge from testimony (2011, p. 76). 
To understand Faulkner’s worry, consider a case where a newspaper reader reads that the 
distance from the Earth to the Sun is some 150 million kilometers (p). Faulkner rightly contends 
that since this is a paradigm example of knowledge acquisition, it must be explainable in 
reductive terms if Reductionism were true. The evidence that grounds the knowledge presented 
in the newspaper is the extended body of warrant. Let us call it E1. Let us call the evidence that 
explains the reader’s uptake E2, which is the reader’s own proprietary body of justification. The 
worry with Reductionism is that E1 is essentially irrelevant to the possession of knowledge. It is 
E2 that determines both the reader’s warrant for uptake and the reader’s warrant for believing p. 
Therefore, pure Reductionism misses out on the scientific or theoretical extended body of 
warrant (E1) and fails to provide a non-skeptical response.12 
Faulkner employs another example to illustrate the shortcomings of Reductionism. 
Consider a case where a husband is told by his wife that the plane is boarding in fifteen minutes. 
He could easily produce an inductive argument to the truth of what his wife says. But this would 
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distort and over-intellectualize his reasons for uptake, which is rather simply that he trusts her in 
this matter. Thus, Faulkner’s non-skeptical response states that cooperation can be rationalized 
by an attitude of trust. Trust provides a reason that warrants uptake and puts the hearer in contact 
with the extended body of warrant. So far, I agree with Faulkner about the shortcomings of 
Reductionism and the merits of trust as a reason-providing attitude. My concern is with 
Faulkner’s rejection of Non-Reductionism and the subsequent adoption of a PR-N-Always 
uptake principle in response to concerns about gullibility. I turn now to these points. 
§ 4.3.3 Faulkner Rejecting Non-Reductionism 
Let us look at Faulkner’s criticisms of Non-Reductionism in more detail. To understand his 
problem with the view, let us examine a paradigmatic example of a non-reductionist uptake 
principle in Burge’s acceptance principle: “A person is entitled to accept as true something that 
is presented as true and that is intelligible to her, unless there are stronger reasons not to do so” 
(1993, p. 467). This principle is defended by appeal to the following reasoning: that apparent 
intelligibility of an instance of testimony for a hearer allows for the presumption of the 
rationality of the speaker, and such a presumption of rationality implies a presumption of truth. 
According to Faulkner, any purported entitlement to accept testimony encounters an ‘immediate 
and difficult problem’: that it can be rational to lie. The acceptance principle, and entitlements 
generally, do not “pay attention to the fact that telling is a practical activity” (2011, p. 99), and 
the role of communication is not exclusively to inform the hearer and nothing else. Given this, 
no-defeaters condition will not suffice. As he notes, it is “[...] doxastically irresponsible to accept 
testimony without some background belief in the testimony's credibility or truth” (p. 99). For 
Faulkner, communication is primarily a practical, intentional activity and that misleading or 
deceitful communications are commonplace. Communication requires protection from these 
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problems in ways that (something like) Burge’s principle does. In the case of perception and 
memory, rational acceptance requires only the absence of defeating background beliefs to 
counteract error. In the case of communication, we need to account for both error and deception.  
Faulkner argues that Non-Reductionism treats testimonial warrant as akin to perception 
and memory. They cast the challenge of the problem of cooperation in terms of an ‘argument 
from error’ (I am not dreaming, hallucinating, etc.), which is mistakenly thought to be covered 
by a no-defeater condition (central to Non-Reductionism). However, Faulkner argues this is a 
mistake, since it is not a simple argument from error of the faculties. There are practical 
considerations as well, so supporting positive reasons are needed in addition to a no-defeater 
condition in order to satisfy rational acceptance in these cases. Thus, because Non-Reductionism 
fails to account for the fact that testimony is primarily a practical activity, the principle of 
credulity, other things being equal, leads to gullibility. Faulkner concludes that in the case of 
testimony “rational acceptance requires the presence of supporting background beliefs” (2000, 
p. 587, my emphasis). This is a clear endorsement of the PR-N-Always thesis. Faulkner is 
correct to suppose testimonial uptake is sensitive to practical considerations. However, he is too 
hasty to adopt PR-N-Always. My theory can accommodate practical stakes with the more 
balanced uptake principle. I discuss these points further in §5. First, let us state Faulkner’s view. 
§ 4.3.4 Faulkner’s Theory of Trust 
We can now discern the nuances of his theory, which is stated as follows: 
(A) Confronted by testimony to p, an audience A is warranted in testimonial uptake if and 
only if A’s other attitudes make it reasonable for A to believe that p. 
(B) Where A believes that p through uptake of testimony to p, A is testimonially warranted in 
believing that p only if a prior speaker was warranted in believing that p. 
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(C) If A’s uptake of testimony to p is warranted and a prior speaker was warranted in 
believing that p, then the extended body of warrant that supports the proposition that p, 
comes to support A’s belief that p (2011, p. 201). 
Thesis (A) states the principle of reasonable uptake supported by the argument from 
cooperation. This thesis is individualist because it concerns reasons an audience has ‘by 
reflection alone’. It is also internalist because it makes acquisition of warranted belief depend 
upon an audience’s reasons. 
The goodness of these reasons given by whether they rationalize 
dependence rather than ground knowledge. The attitude of affective 
trust can give an audience a good reason for uptake. And once it is 
recognized these reasons need not ground an audience’s knowledge, 
any belief that allows a prediction of truth will do. All that is needed is 
that the reason for uptake is an explanatory epistemic reason, and 
reasons that could not suffice for the reductive project may still be this 
(p. 202). 
The audience’s reasons play a role in warranting testimonial uptake, but Faulkner 
contends, this is not the essential role, which is rather to make the extended body of warrant 
available to the audience.  
Thesis (B) states that there must be an extended body of warrant, so the extent that an 
audience’s reasons are good ones is the sense in which they epistemically rationalize dependence 
and they ‘suffice to put the audience in a position to inherit what extended body of warrant is 
available.’ (p. 203). 
In central cases, one needs to possess reasons to be warranted in 
testimonial uptake, but it is reasons one does not possess that warrant 
one’s testimonial beliefs. Since the reasons one needs are reasons for 
thinking that a bit of testimony is true, and these reasons could be 
delivered by an attitude of affective or predictive trust, one could 
equally say that testimony transmits knowledge and warrant by means 
of trust. Or simply that testimonial knowledge is knowledge on trust 
(p. 203). 
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What he refers to here as ‘central cases’ may refer to a small subset of cases where the 
stakes are high, and they thereby make the epistemic unfriendliness of the environment high. 
Indeed, my view would hold that one needs to possess positive reasons in those cases and 
affective trust is not sufficient due to the unfriendliness of the environment. 
Thesis (C) states the evidential explanation of transmission. It is anti-individualist since 
“whether or not a testimonially presented proposition comes with the support of an extended 
body of warrant is a social fact. It is social externalist, the holding of this social fact is not 
something discernible to an audience by searching reflection alone” (p. 201-2). 
Faulkner’s picture presented above responds to the gullibility objection, grounded in the 
problem of cooperation, by holding the reductionist uptake principle PR-N-Always. Faulkner’s 
use of PR-N-Always is less objectionable than others. He improves the principle by allowing for 
trust to count as a reason for uptake, by virtue of trust putting the epistemic subject in contact 
with the extended body of warrant. This significantly and directly lessens the force of the 
objections to typical reductionist projects. However, Faulkner’s view takes the fact that there are 
non-epistemic factors present in testimonial exchanges to motivate an undue adoption of the 
rigid PR-N-Always uptake principle. Nevertheless, on my view, the fact that non-epistemic 
factors play a role in determining testimonial warrant does not foist one down this path. 
§ 5. Questions and Objections 
§ 5.1. Alternative Hybrid Views 
One question is whether my theory is really better than alternatives. To answer this, I will further 
contrast elements of my view with parts of the views discussed in the previous section. Note that 
these are views I already hold in high regard as they have recognized the need to go beyond the 
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traditional divide between Reductionism and Non-Reductionism. However, while on the right 
path, my view still stands as an improvement in various ways. 
§ 5.1.1 Pritchard 
My view accepts, as Pritchard does, the premise that there are ability and safety conditions on 
testimonial knowledge. Nevertheless, my theory arguably arrives at a more nuanced result than 
his does. Mine does not reject robust credulism, that one can gain knowledge absent any non-
testimonial positive reasons. My view even draws a principled distinction when it is possible and 
when it is not. Though we begin with similar premises in that regard, my theory has different 
outcomes than his. Rather than a blanket rejection of robust credulism, the PR-N-Unfriendly 
grants it is possible to gain knowledge in this way if the environment is friendly. At the very 
least then, it can be said that my theory does better against the over-intellectualization and 
skepticism objections in §2. It also possesses greater explanatory power concerning the fact that 
we are more optimistic about epistemic attributions in safe or friendly epistemic environments 
than those that are not. When epistemic environments are unsafe or unfriendly, a greater use of 
(and reliance on) relevant cognitive abilities is required to correctly ascribe knowledge. This is 
reflected in my dual-process theory of epistemic trust. While discussing Pritchard’s view, it 
became clearer how the ability and safety conditions on knowledge are related. I suggested that 
epistemic trust could satisfy the ability requirement while the safety requirement is sensitive to 
stakes. It does not seem like a stretch to say ET constitutes a cognitive ability. As we have seen, 
for Pritchard, the harsher the epistemic environment, the higher the reliance on the prowess of 
cognitive ability.  
How much any amount of unsafeness matters is magnified by an increase in the hearer’s 
stakes. The higher stakes are, the more the lack of safety of an environment matters and this is 
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captured by PR-N-Unfriendly. It should be highly intuitive then, that when unfriendliness of an 
environment is magnified, justified uptake requires more skillful wielding of one’s cognitive 
abilities. This relationship between stakes and cognitive abilities has explanatory power because 
it can capture both desiderata of a theory of testimony (that it leads neither to gullibility nor to a 
general skepticism). A regular, low-stakes testimonial instance can be warrantedly uptaken by 
the ‘default’ pathway, which is generally credulous, barring any obvious defeaters. This is 
reflected in AET and in non-reductionist theorizing. However, a shift towards higher stakes can 
influence the epistemic friendliness of the environment. In turn, this affects the epistemic 
demands of warranted uptake, which would then require a shift to the reflective CET pathway. 
My uptake principle provides a clear explanation of exactly when additional positive reasons are 
required for warranted uptake, and thereby supports a version of credulism somewhere between 
the weak and strong versions we saw in Pritchard. This version suggests warrant/knowledge can, 
sometimes, be traceable to entirely testimonial support. The difficulty was to say when, and my 
theory has specified an answer: it depends on the non-epistemic factors of the hearer. 
§ 5.1.2 Faulkner 
As discussed, Faulkner holds the PR-N-Always uptake principle13, which is fundamentally 
incompatible with my proposed uptake principle, the PR-N-Unfriendly. While epistemic trust 
plays a central role in both our views, mine is a better middle-ground between gullibility and 
skepticism, while still preserving (and being indebted to) many of Faulkner’s insights. The main 
improvement is employing the epistemic subjects’ stakes toward epistemic explanations. This 
can greatly illuminate the relationship between the testimonial environment and the mental lives 
of subjects and has crucial explanatory and theoretical power. Faulkner’s view does not detail 
these aspects and therefore mine can provide a net improvement at no additional theoretical cost. 
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§ 5.1.3 Lackey 
Lackey explicitly subscribes to the PR-N-Always uptake principle. This leaves her hybrid 
position vulnerable to the over-intellectualization and skepticism objections to a greater extent 
than my view. Another worry I want to discuss is the failure of ALIEN to do the work Lackey 
wants it to do: prove the truth of PR-N-Always, reject a general entitlement to accept testimony, 
or both. First, let us entertain the suggestion that Non-Reductionism is a thesis about human 
testimony (and entitlements extend only to human subjects). Surely, one can hold that view 
without losing much ground? Lackey anticipates this and offers a reply: a case where it is a 
human not an alien. Consider SALLY: 
Sally has been in a coma for two months, and when she wakes up, discovers she has lost 
all her previous knowledge except for her competence with the English language. Upon 
leaving the hospital, she stumbles on a diary and begins reading it. Ex hypothesi, Sally no 
longer has common-sense beliefs about human psychology, no longer any beliefs about 
the general reliability of humans as testifiers and no beliefs about how diaries function in 
our society, etc. Is Sally justified in accepting the contents?14 
 
Lackey believes these cases are similar in ‘all epistemically relevant respects’ (p. 174) 
and takes the SALLY case to show that restricting the scope of Non-Reductionism to humans 
does not work. For her, these two cases together suggest the falsity of Non-Reductionism and 
support PR-N-Always. But are ALIEN and SALLY cases epistemically similar in all relevant 
respects? Lackey shrewdly anticipates this question and counters with a question: why aren’t we 
entitled to assume that aliens are like us in all relevant respects? She says the natural answer 
seems to be we do not have any reason to believe that is the case. Thus, “the very criterion for 
saying who is or is not a member of our institution of testimony is simply whether we have 
positive reasons for uptaking their testimony - which begs the question” (p. 174).  
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One way of resisting Lackey here is to note a way the cases are disanalogous. When Sam 
sees the Alien, it is a defeater, precisely because it is an Alien and not a human. It is not simply 
an issue of the lack of information about the testifier, there is additional positive pressure that 
acts as a defeater because tacitly one can recognize aliens are not like human testifiers. In Sally’s 
case, it does not matter who is testifying - a cunning fox, human or alien. But in Sam’s case, who 
is testifying does matter and so there is at least one important way those cases differ.  
Setting the note about the cases being disanalogous aside, the cases do very little to 
suggest the truth of PR-N-Always or disprove the existence of a human entitlement to accept 
testimony. A Non-Reductionist could say that, properly understood, neither the NR2 (no 
defeaters) or NR6 (good environment) conditions are satisfied in ALIEN. Lackey anticipates the 
objection about undefeated defeaters, responding that the only negative reason (defeater) that 
would block warranted uptake, in this case, is the absence of positive reasons. But non-
reductionists cannot help themselves to that without simply ‘collapsing into Reductionism’. 
Therefore, she concludes, ALIEN really is evidence of the truth of PR-N-Always. 
Other ways to resist Lackey’s conclusion include appealing to the nature of testimonial 
warrant to explain why a strong entitlement to accept testimony may exist for humans but not for 
non-humans. ‘Belonging to the same testimonial institution’ need not be the kind of ‘positive 
reasons’ required by PR-N-Always. It can be tacit, subconscious and inarticulable, and still 
convey positive epistemic standing. Since it is an entitlement, it is not required to be cognitively 
accessible or articulable to have epistemic force (§1)15. The existence of practical and moral 
aspects of a testimonial institution can also arguably explain intuitions in the ALIEN or SALLY 
rather than confirm the truth of Lackey’s uptake principle. The cases reveal subtleties of the 
mental life of agents and the testimonial institutions they are embedded in and these factors may 
influence more than previously supposed.16 To contrast my view with Non-Reductionism one 
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last time, imagine an instance of testimony where an agent would have truly no epistemic 
defeaters. Classical Non-Reductionism would ascribe warranted uptake in this case. How mine 
would rule depends on non-epistemic factors other than the presence of epistemic defeaters, i.e. 
the subject stakes. Although Lackey provides a crafty explanation, my theory has an easier one 
available: The ALIEN case presumably contains very high subject stakes for Sam pertaining to 
the truth of the testimony (e.g., uptaking the testimony would undermine the very coherence of 
one’s worldview, one’s sanity, etc.). The perceived safety would also be remarkably low. 
Therefore, the environment would be incredibly epistemically unfriendly. Neither Lackey nor the 
Non-Reductionist have access to this explanation without a sufficiently detailed account of how 
non-epistemic factors and the wider testimonial institutionality can influence warrant of uptake. 
In sum, problems facing other hybrids do not extend as forcefully to mine. In addition, 
my view arguably preserves important theoretical desiderata better than theirs. I attribute these 
advantages in main part to the inclusion of subject stakes and epistemic trust in explanatory 
roles. This adoption has no steep philosophical cost for the explanatory benefits it affords. 
§ 5.2 The Epistemic Trust Condition on Testimony? 
My theory entails the Epistemic Trust Condition on Testimony (ETC): for an instance of 
testimonial uptake to be warranted, it must have been instantiated through epistemic trust that 
was warranted. That is, warranted epistemic trust is a necessary condition for warranted 
testimonial uptake. One implication is that variables which affect the justification of an instance 
of epistemic trust also affect the justification of the testimonial uptake thereafter. What if this 
were to be challenged? Since the ETC is implied by my theory, its falsity would undermine my 
view and its truth at least offers some support. However, if the relevant alternatives to my claim 
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can be shown to be false, it can be reasonably concluded that justified epistemic trust is a 
necessary condition on justified testimony. 
I assume it must be possible for testimonial uptake to be sometimes justified, as to avoid 
a skeptical response to our problem (since granting otherwise would constitute too much of a 
departure from common sense). An alternative challenge to the ETC is the claim that there can 
be instances of justified testimonial uptake, instantiated through unjustified trust. In fact, this 
idea will consistently fail to produce intuitive results. Consider how incongruent it sounds to 
assert ‘H is justified in uptaking the belief that p based on S’s testimony that p, but H’s epistemic 
trust in S that p is unjustified’. If the epistemic trust leading to testimonial uptake were 
unjustified, it would be a defeater of the uptake’s justification. If a process is unjustified, the 
result will be as well, regardless of whether the ensuing belief is true or not. That is why asking a 
crystal ball questions to form beliefs leads to unjustified uptake, regardless of whether those 
beliefs are true (and even if uptake of those beliefs would have been justified through another 
method). A bad method undermines the justification of the belief, and so unjustified epistemic 
trust cannot lead to justified uptake.  
One might object that sometimes unjustified methods can lead to justified uptake. Let us 
entertain a case where S is generally untrustworthy, yet H is justified in epistemically trusting S 
that p. Say that S has no knowledge or expertise about anything other than automotive matters, 
but in that, he is widely hailed as an expert by other experts in the field. If S testifies that H’s 
brakes need changing (p), H is justified in epistemically trusting S that p and uptaking the belief 
that p. However, one can be generally untrustworthy on all matters not relevant to p. As long as 
they are trustworthy with respect to p, H is justified in trusting S that p and uptaking the belief 
that p. In similar cases, the trust method would not really be unjustified with respect to p. 
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Another alternative to my claim is that testimonial uptake can be justified without the 
presence of justified epistemic trust at all. But one will be hard-pressed to think of such 
examples. Intuitively, justified testimonial uptake depends crucially on something gained 
through epistemic trust: contact with the extended body of warrant of a claim (as defined in §1 
and as discussed in §4.3.2). Consider the important difference between the case where I surmise 
(correctly) that my neighbour Dina is upset (p) despite any evidence and believe that p based on 
nothing but my own whims in this case. Contrast this with the case where I form the belief that p 
based on my trust in her partner’s testimony that p (who is warranted in believing that p from 
first-hand experience that p). The second case puts me in contact with the extended body of 
warrant (in this situation, the warrant of Dina’s partner’s belief that p). The second case is 
connected in some way to the truth while the first is not. Justified ET does this tethering. 
Furthermore, consider the oddity of the following proposition “H justifiedly uptakes new 
belief p on the basis of S’s testimony that p, but H does not have justified epistemic trust in S 
that p”. How could H’s uptake be justified absent justified epistemic trust? The ability to 
epistemically trust connects the agent with the extended body of warrant. If the belief based in 
testimony is to be justified, then the epistemic trust that supports the belief must be justified. 
Although perhaps not logically contradictory, the utterance seems intuitively incoherent. These 
considerations suggest we can safely conclude the ETC is true, which lends support to my view. 
§ 5.3 Pragmatic Justification versus Epistemic Justification 
A unique and crucial feature of my view is that it draws on non-epistemic factors for explanatory 
power in epistemological matters. The term ‘Pragmatic encroachment’ has been used to refer to 
the notion that pragmatic considerations encroach on epistemic ones. One way to understand this 
is that there are practical conditions on justification or knowing. At least two broad strategies 
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have been used to support this hypothesis. The first is an appeal to intuitions and subsequent 
empirical data about epistemic attributions regarding philosophical cases. This includes 
experimental philosophy and the results from studies probing layperson and philosophers’ 
intuitions alike (Croce & Poenicke, 2017; Sripada & Stanley, 2012). The second strategy is to 
make a theoretical case for a pragmatic condition on knowledge. That is, arguing that whatever 
theory of knowledge one holds (of the form JTB + x) should be supplemented by an additional 
condition c, which requires some kind of sensitivity to subjective interests. Many authors have 
argued for a practical condition on knowledge, notably Fantl & McGrath (2002; 2009); 
Hawthorne (2003); Stanley (2005). I do not in any way wish to make the claim that stakes affect 
truth, but that their influence is on the epistemic environment and mental lives of subjects, which 
in turn affects the warrant of testimonial uptake. The PR-N-Unfriendly states that stakes affect 
the testimonial environment in a way that will influence warranted uptake and knowledge 
ascriptions.17 My view is, of course, compatible with the notion of pragmatic encroachment. I 
will offer a case to support the claim that there is an intuitive link between attributions of 
epistemic warrant and the stakes of epistemic subjects. I submit that the link is so strong that the 
attributions of warrant to a belief can change retroactively if stakes shift too drastically. This is 
something we would expect if my theory were true. The following case supports the claim that 
stakes influence epistemic warrant. 
Reliable speaker S tells hearer H that carrots are safe for dogs (p). H is not a dog owner 
and is not acquainted with any dogs, and so has relatively low stakes pertaining to this claim. H 
trusts S that p and goes on a good while with this inconsequential belief. I take it that H was 
justified (entitled, warranted) in uptaking based on S’s testimony on this matter in a way that can 
lead to knowledge. However, eventually, a new friend of H, call them F, entrusts H to care for a 
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cherished dog. Friend F is in a hurry for a family emergency and leaves town without any 
specific canine dietary information for H.  
H’s stakes regarding the initial belief have now presumably gone up and with them the 
justificatory evidential demands on H’s trust in S that p. These heightened epistemic demands 
would require additional reasons for sustaining the belief. It can be said that H no longer knows 
(believes/trusts with justification/warrant), in any relevant sense, that carrots are safe for dogs. 
Additional positive reasons would be required to support this claim e.g., a quick search engine 
consultation revealing carrots are generally safe for dogs. When stakes shift drastically, there is a 
retroactive change in the epistemic status of the belief - H is no longer justified (entitled, 
warranted) to cling to the initial testimonially-based belief because of heightened evidential 
pressure on epistemic friendliness by having higher stakes. In the low-stakes situation, 
testimonial uptake is justified because of the general friendliness of the testimonial environment. 
Imagine if the first time H were to receive the same testimony from his original friend, 
speaker S, came after already being entrusted with F’s dog. In that case, justified uptake of that 
claim would seem to require something like additional positive reasons e.g., inference from 
experience, or additional research. The fact that even the justification of previously held 
testimonial beliefs comes under threat when stakes change suggests a deep connection between 
epistemic justification and stakes; one preserved even after the initial moment of uptake.18 
The traditional orthodoxy in academic epistemology is that the concept of knowledge is 
free from any practical considerations. Of course, being offered a large sum of money to believe 
something might make you pragmatically justified to believe it but does not make it likelier to be 
true. I readily grant this. But this does not refute my claim, nor pragmatic encroachment more 
generally. All that this shows is that subjects’ stakes have no bearing on the truth of a claim. 
However, it does not follow that subject stakes have no bearing on the justification, warrant or 
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knowledge of a claim. Truth is one condition on knowledge but there is plainly more to 
knowledge than truth. I submit there is no principled reason as to why knowledge cannot have a 
fourth (or N-th) practical condition e.g. sensitivity to subject’s stakes. A change of stakes can 
change the evidential threshold for a piece of data to count as good evidence (perhaps to count as 
evidence at all). A full treatment of the practical conditions on positive epistemic standings is 
beyond the scope of this paper. Nonetheless, I hope to have adequately cast doubt on the 
assumption that positive epistemic standing is completely free from non-epistemic factors.  
§ 6. Conclusion 
This work emphasized the relationship between epistemic trust, testimony, the epistemic 
subject’s stakes and the testimonial environment. I have argued that pure Reductionism and Non-
Reductionism alone are untenable because they are very vulnerable to skepticism and gullibility-
style objections. Furthermore, hybrid views overreact to gullibility-style objections and adopt an 
overly restrictive uptake principle. They are also unsatisfactory because they do not adequately 
consider subject stakes and thereby miss out on their explanatory power. Furthermore, except for 
Faulkner, the role of epistemic trust is similarly neglected and leaves the theories worse off for it. 
I have argued for a condition on warranted testimonial uptake: it must come through warranted 
epistemic trust. I have specified how and when epistemic trust is warranted for both the affective 
and cognitive kinds. My view strikes a better balance between the desiderata of non-gullibility 
and non-generalized skepticism of testimony better than others do, at no significant cost. 
                                               
1 ‘Global’ reductionists hold that one must have good positive reasons for believing that testimony is generally 
reliable e.g., past experience from testimony etc. ‘Local’ reductionists hold that a hearer’s positive reasons need only 
apply to beliefs about a particular speaker in a particular case e.g. previous history with testifier, their 
trustworthiness etc. 
2 Notice that the force with which we ascribe warrant or justification to the hearer at the bus stop seems to depend on 
their stakes. If they had an interview for their dream job and being late disqualified them from the opportunity, they 
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could be very much be faulted for so readily accepting or relying on testimony. In such a high-stakes case, uptake 
may not be warranted after all and my theory reflects this. 
3 I maintain that stakes can be very low but are always non-zero so that in limit cases we do not end up ‘dividing by 
zero’. This move is justified by appeal to the fact that it is an epistemic virtue to obtain true beliefs over false ones, 
no matter how insignificant they seem. So, stakes are always non-zero even if they are infinitesimally small. 
4 The epistemic safety of belief measures whether the uptake of belief would still be true/warranted if things had 
been slightly different. One way of putting it would be that a belief is epistemically safe if it could not have easily 
been wrong. In the literature on safety, what counts as ‘easily being wrong’ typically gets explained in terms of what 
would be the case in ‘relevant’ alternate worlds, or ‘close/nearby’ possible worlds. That discussion would take me 
too far astray for the present purposes, so I leave it open exactly how ‘not being easily wrong’ can get hashed out. 
5 Whether (and to what degree) an environment is epistemically friendly is mainly influenced by two variables: the 
perceived epistemic safety of the environment and the epistemic subject’s stakes. Let us illustrate with a pair of 
examples: A good friend is hosting a potluck and tells me that, although her cookies usually contain nuts, this batch 
does not. I do not have nut allergies, so my stakes are low, and I perceive the environment as being safe (and I’m an 
adequately perceptive agent and indeed the environment is safe). In this case, the epistemic environment is friendly 
to me. Take the same situation but with an agent that has severe life-threatening nut allergies. Even if they are 
generally trusting with regards to their friend and perceive the environment as safe (and they are adequately 
perceptive agents and indeed it is safe) it would not be friendly (or as friendly) due to the presence of very high 
stakes. As mentioned, stakes are not the only variable at play. Stakes can be low, but if the perceived epistemic 
safety is low (and the agent is an adequate perceptive agent) then the environment would not be (as) epistemically 
friendly. Let us take another pair of examples: I visit Liarsville, which has a reputation that all the inhabitants lie to 
outsiders. I ask the first person I see about the town’s reputation and they assure me the rumors are hogwash and that 
there are no liars in Liarsville. Even if my stakes are low, the perceived epistemic safety would be low, which in turn 
would drive down the total epistemic friendliness score of the environment. On the other hand, had I asked the same 
question in my visit to Truthville (with equally low stakes), where inhabitants are known to be extremely truthful in 
their testimony, then perceived epistemic safety would be high and therefore epistemic friendliness would be high. 
6 This condition is trivially true, but it helps set up the case distinction, an important part of my argument. 
7 One worry can be stated regarding my explication of normative terms (e.g., justification/warrant) by appealing to 
other normative terms (e.g., ‘adequate perceptive agent’ in Condition 2 and the ‘justification of cognitive and 
affective epistemic trust’ in Condition 5 and 7). My explication of ‘justified’ epistemic trust of both kinds eventually 
bottoms out in non-normative terms: justification of cognitive epistemic trust is explicated by appeal to a 
requirement of additional positive reasons. The justification of affective epistemic trust is explicated in virtue of 
being a ‘basic belief forming method’, like modus ponens or inference to the best explanation, methods we are often 
fundamentally required to engage in to build both our knowledge foundations and subsequent new knowledge. 
8 Barring extraordinary circumstances, say we are allergic to nuts and investigating whether it contains nuts, but this 
case merely confirms that CET is required in that case due to higher stakes in the claims, supporting my theory. 
9 “In no part” vs. “entirely recoverable” - these are not logical negations. 
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10 Note that the written case is not the paradigmatic case. Let alone Sam’s potential concerns about whether it is, in 
fact, the alien’s own diary (and therefore, whether it is testimony at all). 
11 In a discussion with Faulkner, he did no understand CET to be a distinct attitude from AET, but rather it seemed 
to be AET and an additional justification criterion. Although I am still undecided, in the present debate, surprisingly 
little of philosophical import hangs on whether they are fully distinct attitudes or not. 
12 I take it that any view that does not draw on the explanatory power of epistemic trust is vulnerable to this worry. 
On my view, it is through epistemic trust that one can come into contact with the extended body of scientific 
warrant. For example, epistemic trust in my teacher’s testimony regarding the truth of evolution puts me in contact 
with the scientific body of warrant in a way that I would not be had I arrived at the belief by simple guesswork. 
13 Confirmed in conversation with Faulkner. 
14 Although I consider a theory of testimony should be able to account for written testimony, this is once again a 
non-paradigmatic case of testimony. There is also the worry that Sally is not an adequate recipient of testimony (and 
therefore NR1-6 would not be satisfied). 
15 Reasons like ‘belonging to same institutions’ which ground entitlements can be perceived and articulated, but they 
need not be. 
16 One interesting point is the idea that entitlements, like the warrant they convey, are matters of degree. My view is 
compatible with the possibility that entitlements are entirely indefeasible insofar as the warrant they convey never 
disappears. It may be that in very high stakes cases or epistemically unfriendly environments, something additional 
on top of this entitlement is required for justified uptake (positive reasons become necessary). The warrant conveyed 
from the entitlement would not be gone, just insufficient to entirely warrant uptake. As mentioned early in §1, my 
view is compatible with both internalist and externalist kinds of warrant acting at once on a specific instance of 
testimony. For the belief to be epistemically warranted, we must count the conjunction of both internalist and 
externalist warrant and calculate it against the epistemic friendliness of the environment. 
17 Some philosophers draw a distinction between ‘saying one knows’ and ‘knowledge’ and hold these have different 
requirements. One worry is that my theory conflates knowledge and warranted assertibility. But my theory should 
not be confused with one about warranted assertibility. It is meant to track testimonial knowledge. I hold warranted 
assertibility and correct knowledge ascriptions must be linked to knowledge in some way. While the exact details of 
that relationship cannot be fleshed out here, it is still an important notion to disambiguate. 
18 I would like to contrast contextualism about knowledge with the subject-sensitive invariantism (SSI) of my view. 
In the initial stages of this work, I was charmed by contextualist arguments from Keith de Rose and others which 
held that whether an instance counts as knowledge varies with the context. I thought my view would ultimately be a 
contextualist one. However, I eventually realized I did not believe it was that knowledge varies with the context, but 
that knowledge is in fact invariant: it is invariably sensitive to stakes. So, I still maintain a form of invariantism 
about knowledge – it is an invariable fact of knowledge it is sensitive to subjective interests. Therefore, as it stands, 
subject-sensitive invariantism more aptly captures my view than contextualism does. 
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